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This paper presents the first nonparametric test whether German works councils go hand in 
hand with higher labor productivity or not. It distinguishes between establishments that are 
covered by collective bargaining or not. Results from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for first 
order stochastic dominance tend to indicate that pro-productive effects are found in firms with 
collective bargaining only. However, the significance level of the test statistic is higher than a 
usually applied critical level.  This somewhat weak evidence casts doubts on the validity of 
results from recent parametric approaches using a regression framework that point to high 
positive effects of works councils on productivity. 
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1.  Motivation 
 
The crucial role of productivity for prosperity and growth of an economy is one of the central 
findings from modern growth theory and empirics. As Elchanan Helpman (2004, p. 55) 
recently put is: “Productivity ... accounts for more than half the variation across countries in 
income per capita, and much more than half the variation across countries in growth rates of 
income per capita. Therefore, to understand the sources of economic growth, one must 
understand what causes productivity growth.” He goes on to point out the crucial role of 
institutions (like property rights, and the rule of law) for growth, and argues that a better 
understanding of several features of modern societies, including the structure of labor 
relations, is extremely important for greater insight into modern economic growth (Helpman 
2004, p. 141). 
 
One of the institutions that are specific to labor relations in Germany is the works council. 
Workers in establishments with at least five employees have the right to elect a works council 
who has information, consultation, and codetermination rights. Note that works councils 
while mandatory are not automatic and, as a practical matter, their presence is sporadic in 
smaller establishments and near universal in large plants with 500 workers or more (for 
details, see Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel and Wagner 2004). 
 
In theory, works councils can be expected to have both positive and negative impacts on firm 
performance due to its two faces: On the one hand, works councils can use their powers to 
delay or modify management decisions and shift rents to the employees. On the other hand, 
they can also improve the efficiency of the establishment through productive information 
exchange, consultation, and codetermination. A canonical reference for the theoretical 
discussion of these issues is the Freeman and Lazear (1995) model.   3
 
It follows that establishing the direction and extent of works councils’ impact on productivity 
is an empirical question. The econometric literature on German works councils is a work in 
progress, so that there is ongoing debate as to the consequences of the institution (a recent 
contribution is Schank, Schnabel and Wagner 2004; for a comprehensive survey, see 
Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 2004). In an important contribution to this debate Hübler and 
Jirjahn (2003) use a bargaining model to derive the hypothesis that in establishments covered 
by collective bargaining agreements works councils are more likely to be engaged in 
productivity-enhancing activities and less engaged in rent-seeking activities than their 
counterparts in uncovered establishments. They argue that even if productivity-enhancing 
work practices must be negotiated at the establishment level between management and works 
councils, these are more easily negotiated when substantial distributional conflicts are 
moderated on a central level by unions and employers’ associations. In an empirical analysis 
using a regression framework this hypothesis is confirmed. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on role of labor relations for productivity in Germany 
by providing the first nonparametric test of the hypothesis put forward by Hübler and Jirjahn 
(2003). The main advantage of the procedure used here is that it tests not only for differences 
in the mean productivity of both groups of establishments but for differences in all moments 
of the productivity distribution. Section 2 discusses the empirical strategy and the plant level 
data used; section 3 presents the empirical results; section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Empirical strategy and data 
 
The empirical strategy applied here to test the hypothesis stated above uses a non-parametric 
test for first order stochastic dominance of one productivity distribution over another (for a   4
recent application in a related area, see Wagner 2005): Let F and G denote the cumulative 
distribution functions of productivity for two groups of firms (say, firms with and without a 
works council). First order stochastic dominance of F relative to G is given if F(z) – G(z) is 
less or equal zero for all z with strict inequality for some z. Given two independent random 
samples of plants from each group, the hypothesis that F is to the right of G can be tested by 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test based on the empirical distribution functions for F and G in the 
samples (for details, see Conover 1999, p. 456ff.). Note that this tests not only for differences 
in the mean productivity of both groups (like in almost all other papers in the literature on 
works councils and productivity) but for differences in all moments of the distribution. 
 
The data used in this note were collected in personal interviews with firm owners or top 
managers. The population covered encompasses all manufacturing establishments with at 
least 5 employees in the German state of Lower Saxony. From this population a random 
sample (stratified by industry and size classes) was interviewed. Detailed information on the 
data set and how it can be accessed by researchers is given in Gerlach, Hübler and Meyer 
(2003). This survey has information on whether or not a plant had a works council in 1994, 
and whether or not it was covered by collective bargaining. Therefore, we can distinguish four 
groups of establishments: Group A with a works council and with coverage by collective 
bargaining, Group B without a works council and with coverage by collective bargaining, 
Group C with a works council and without coverage by collective bargaining, and Group D 
without a works council and without coverage by collective bargaining. According to the 
theoretical hypothesis stated above the distribution of productivity in Group A should 
dominate the distribution in Group B, while this should not be the case for Group C compared 
with Group D. 
   5
To test this hypothesis the sample is restricted to establishments with 21 to 100 employees for 
three reasons: First, works councils are more often found in larger establishments. If 
establishments from all size classes with and without works councils were compared, scale 
effects and works council effects might be mixed. Second, works council rights are a step-
function of establishment size measured by the number of employees, with works councils in 
larger establishments having more far-reaching codetermination rights. These works council 
rights, however, are a datum in establishments with 21 to 100 employees. Third, works 
councils tend to be rare in establishments with less than 21 employees, and more or less the 
rule in establishments with more than 100 employees, while about half of all establishments 
with 21 to 100 employees have a works council. Therefore, looking at establishments with 21 
to 100 employees separately is a common approach in the empirical literature dealing with 
works council’s impacts. 
 
A disadvantage which is common in the kind of survey data used here is that we do not have 
information on the capital stock; therefore, we cannot calculate total factor productivity. 
Instead, we use value added per employee as an indicator for labour productivity. To mitigate 
concerns that performance differences simply reflect differences in the sectoral composition 
of the firm types, value added per employee is calculated relative to the two-digit industry 




The sample used here is made of 294 manufacturing establishments, 160 (or 54 percent) of 
which had a works council. 126 establishments belong to Group A (works council, collective 
bargaining),  54 to Group B (no works council, collective bargaining), 34  to Group C (works   6
council, no collective bargaining), and 80 to Group D (no works council, no collective 
bargaining). 
 
According to table I differences of the mean values for value added per employee (calculated 
relative to the two-digit industry mean, and logged) conform with the hypothesis stated above: 
The difference between Group A and Group B is positive and statistically significant at an 
error level of 2.2 percent, while the positive difference between Group C and Group D is not 
statistically significant at any conventional error level. 
 
Results of the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reveal that not only the means of the 
productivity distributions are ranked in this way. Using an error level of 7.5 percent, we find 
that in line with the hypothesis stated above the productivity distribution of Group A 
dominates that of Group B, while the nonparametric test applied here does not reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the two productivity distributions for Group C and Group 
D at any conventional error level. Note, however, that the evidence might be considered 
somewhat weak – the error level of 7.5 percent lies well above the usually used critical level 
of 5 percent. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
This paper presents the first non-parametric test of the hypothesis that German works councils 
go hand in hand with higher labor productivity in establishments that are covered by 
collective bargaining only. Results from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for first order stochastic 
dominance are in line with this hypothesis, although the significance level of the test statistic 
is 7.5 percent – higher than a usually applied critical level.  This somewhat weak evidence   7
casts doubts on the validity of results from recent parametric approaches using a regression 
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Table I 
 
Results of the empirical investigation 
 
 
                                                                                        Group A                       Group B                              Group C                          Group D 
                                                                                  Firms with works            Firms without                  Firms with works             Firms without 
                                                                                  council and with              works council                  council and without         works council 
                                                                                  collective bargaining       and with                          collective bargaining       and without 
                                                                                                                           collective bargaining                                               collective bargaining 
 
 
Number of establishments                 126                               54                                        34                                   80 
Value added/employee  mean               4.499               4.318                                   4.579                              4.477 
        standard deviation           0.403                             0.506                                   0.441                              0.479 
 
 
                                                                                                                    Group A vs. Group B                        Group C vs. Group D 
                                                                                               
 
Prob-values of t-tests for differences in the means
1 
 
Value added/employee                                          0.022                                                  0.137 
 
Prob-values of two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
2 
 
Value added/employee                                                    0.075                                                  0.262 
 
 
1 Test of H0: mean of first group equal to mean of second group against Ha: mean of first group larger than mean of second group 
2 Test of 
 H0: distributions are equal against Ha: distribution of first group stochastically dominates distribution of second group 
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